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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BENNER J. CARLING,
Petitioner,
-vs.INDUSTRIAL CO~I:JIISSION
OF UTAH and
CONSOLIDATED WESTERN
STEEL, Division United States
Steel Corporation,
RespDndents.

)

Case
No.10177

BRIEF O·F PETITIO·NER
STATE:JIENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Petitioner, Benner J. Carling, appeals the decision
and order of the respondent, Industrial Commission of
lTtah (hereinafter called the Commission) denying compensation for permanent partial disability under th0 provisions of Title 35, Chapter 1, lTtah Code AnnotatPd 1953,
a.s amended. The Commission, in denying compensation for petitioner's injury received while \vorking as an
employee of and in the course of his employmPllt \vith
respondent Consolidated Western Steel, Division lT nit0d
States Steel Corporation (hereinafter ealled employ<'r),
apparently based its order upon the finding that thPl'('
was "no eompetent evidence in the record to support
the single incident as the cauAe of he a ring loss."
1
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The petitioner sought such compensation award from
respondent employer because of an impairment to his
hearing s-nffered while using an air gun to tamp sand into
a metal pipe. Plaintiff contends that the Commission's
action in denying an award for accidental injury was improper and unreasonable.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The petitioner's application for benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act was referred by the Commission, as provided by law, to a Medical Panel for findings upon the question of a hearing loss as presented by
the application. The Panel made a finding on the extent of
petitioner's hearing impairment. Objections to that finding were timely filed by petitioner and the proceeding, a
transcript of which is a part of this record, was held. The
purpose of the hearing according to petitioner's understanding, was to permit petitioner to adduce medical evidence to establish the extent of petitioner's hearing
impairment.
The Commission issued its order denying the petitioner any a'vard on the basis that petitioner did not
suffer an industrial accident under Title 35, Chapter 1
of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. Petitioner
in his application for rehearing before the Commission
offered to produce additional and independent testimony
relative to the incident causing petitioner's hearing loss
but such application was denied by the Commission.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Petitioner seeks an order of this Court Yacating
and setting aside the decision and order of the respondent
Commission and remanding this case to the Commission
for determination of the extent of petitioner's disabilitY
with instructions that an a'vard he made in petitioner .,.s
behalf for benefits as provided by the Utah Workmen's
Compensation Act for that disability.
2
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STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

On August 31, 1960, the petitioner, while an employee of respondent employer and while in the course
of his employment, used an air gun to tamp sand into
some metal pipes (R. 9 and 10). The petitioner, after
applying the metal bit attached to the air gun against
the metal pipes at full air velocity for an approximate
period of from 20 to 25 minutes (R. 98) became aware of
a change in his ability to hear and discriminate sounds
(R. 99). Immediately upon noting such chang·ed condition petitioner left his work station and reported to his
immediate foreman, 'vhose name 'vas Delwin Shepard
as follo,vs: "Delwin, I have had something happen. I
can't hear. I have lost my hearing." (R. 99) The petitioner then ceased tamping the sand into the pipe by use
of an air gun and this work was then performed by another employee. (R. 99, 100) That day after work the
petitioner reported to the employer's medical dispensary
concerning such condition. Upon learning that the doctors had already left the dispensary, petitioner reported
to such dispensary the following day. (R. 99) Since
that date petitioner's hearing has been permanently impaired (R. 18, 19 and 71, Ex. No.5).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE RECORD FROlVI THE COMMISSION HEARING ESTABLISHES THAT PETITIONER SlTFFER~JD AN ACCIJ)ENTAI~
INJURY ON AUGUST 31, 1960, WHII.JE USING
AN AIR GUN IN THE COURSE OF HIS l1~M
PLOYMENT WITH RESPONDENT El\fPLO'{ER RESULTING IN A PERMA_NENT PAR.TIAL HEARING DISABILITY.
Respondent Commission in its order state~ "There
is no competent evidence in the record to support the

3
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single incident [the us of air gun on August 31, 1960] as
the cause of hearing loss." Petitioner testified at the
hearing a.s follows :
''A. I "'~as using the air gun only on the tamping of the pipe.
Q. Well, in filling the pipe with sand, you were
using an air gun ~

A. No. Like Mr. Taylor stated, we just hoisted
it up in this big drum, on top, and then dipped it
out with a. bucket into the funnel and filled each
p1pe.

"Q. All right. Now then, "Then the pipe
filled, you used the air gun~

"~as

A. Yes.
Q. Now what bitt was on the air gun 'vhen you
beganf

A. Well, in the process of this I tried to figure
a bitt of my own. I manufactured one out of a
chisel, to fit the gun. I put a steel piece of plate
that fit partway around theQ. Contour of the pipe f
A. Contour of the pipe, yes. And welded it
on the chisel. And I started out using that.
Q. Now when you were using the gun, to 'vhat
extent did you turn the gun on~ Did you haYe it
on at a slow speed, a. moderate speed, or did you
have it on at full speed~
A. Well, I used the gun- On that particular
gun you could just turn partly air into it, and it
would just- It wouldn't, you know, it "~ouldn ,t
give you a heavy charge. Or rattle. So all the
time I was using it I poured it on it.

Q. Wl1en you say you poured it on it, "~hat do
you mean~ You had full4
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Q.

-velocity~

A. Full velocity of the air.
Q. Now did you use the same bitt all the 'vay
through~

A. Yes. In one sense. After, oh, just a few
minutes, I busted this contour piece of steel off.
It wouldn't stay on there. Then I went back and
'velded some more, and cut off the ears and welded
it flat back on, and started over again. And I
didn't get very far with that, until that popped
off again. It just wouldn't hold on. This high
carbon steel, on the bitt, it wouldn't hold onto
this steel plug that I had used to tamp with. And
then I went over to the grinding stone, and that
busted off the second time, and I went over to the
grinding stone and ground the chisel off flat.
THE REFEREE: Can't we stay with the

pipe~

A. And went back to work.
~IR.

YEATES: Q. Well, how long a time, if you
can recall, how long a time were you actually holding the gun, using it against the pipe~
A. Oh, I imagine after I got the chisel back
in shape, the last time where it had busted off, I
probably went approximately some place bet,veen
20 and 25 minutes. From the bottom on up. I had
to change elevations as I went.
Q. So you did this against various points of

the

pipe~

A. Yes.
Q. And after you had done this, then they
added more? Did they add more sand to the
pipe1
A. Well, all the time the fellow that was helping me, working with, he was on top. And as I
5
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beat the pipe, and the sand settled do,vn in it, he
kept filling it in to keep it full.
Q. Had you ever done this type of work for
this company before~ This particula: th~ng . of
holding a.n air gun against the pipe, filling It with
sand~

A. Well, I had never. Not particularly this
type. You mean for this company~
Q. Yes.

A. Never before with a chipping gun.
Q. Why did you stop doing the work on the
pipe~
Did you complete the work before you
stopped~

A. No. No, I didn't get through. I can't recall exactly just how it happened, but I stopped,
and things- The noise, the general noise around
the place there, which is you can hear machines.
There is trains and stuff running around, and
they justQ. Well, were they

muffled~

Or-

A. They were muffled down. I couldn't hear.
So I got off the scaffold and went straight to my
foreman, Delwin Shepherd, and told him of it.
Q. What did you say to him f
..~._L\..

I told him, I said: "Delwin, I haYe had
something happen. I can't hear." I said: "I haYe
lost my hearing."

Q. Did you continue 'vorking on the pipe after
that~

A. Well, I went up on top, and my helper that
was working with me he finished sanding it or
beating the pipe.
'
6
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Q. Did you go to the dispensary that night 1
A. Yes. I did after work. But the doctor had
left.

Q. And then was it the next day that you finally
saw the doctor at the dispensary 1
A .. Yes.

Q. Do you recall what doctor that was 1
A. Well, I can't recall his name. I don't know
the name~ of the doctors up there. It 'vas a fairly
young fellow. He- wore glasses. I couldn't say
what his name was.
~IR.

YEATES: I think that's all.

THE REFEREE: One moment.
(Discussion off the record.)
~IR.

YEATES: Q. Had you ever had this same
condition of hearing that you noticed after doing
this work on the pipes 1 Had this same condition
ever been prese-nt before~
A. No.''

(R. 96 to 100)

Petitioner's testimony was supported and corroborated by testimony of Dr. Dean Gray, ear specialist, a~
follows:

''MR. YEATES: Q. Excuse me. There is onP
thing that I want to get clear here. Dr. Grayand I refer this to Mr. Wiesley - anything that
you want to state as to the reasons why you medically wanted Mr. Finger]e to examine''A. I might say this. For three purpose~ I
sent him there. Number one is I wished him to
confirm the findings that I had reerivctl in mr
own office. Number two is I wished him to rule

7
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upon this man's subjective response to testing,
which is not in the report, and which I had been
reassured by him verbally. Number three is I
wished speech discrimination. Now the first one,
that of confirming my findings, is in the report
here. In the pure tone audiogram which he did,
and which compares with my own audiogram.
Number three, and speech discrimination, he did
obtain this. He found that Mr. Carling-" (R. 17)
''A. Now on speech reception he got- By running speech, that required a decibel level or sound
pressure level of 60 decibels. This is not correct
either. It required 60 decibels of intensity for him
to hear on the left. 75 decibels of intensity on
the right. His speech discrimination was found
to be 90% on the left, and 75% on the right. The
particular record which Mr. Fingerle uses, and
which I am acquainted with and have used myself,
allow for 100% discrimination in a person with
normal hearing. We feel that anything below this
is an abnormal discrimination.
My reason for wishing discrimination is that
on a pure tone audiogram one is unable to actually
define how 'veil a patient understands speech,
which after all is the important thing in a person's
a hili ty to communicate. Not ho"r 'Yell he hears
one particular isola ted tone, but his a bili t' to
reeei ve and understand speech. Discrimin~.tion
does not change. Regardless of intensity of sound,
if a man has 75% intensity, or-excuse me-70%
of discrimination, it matters little 'Yhether you
play something to him with 100 or 200 decibel~ of
intensity. His discrimination does not change.
It remains permanent, and at 75%, regardless of
the intensity. I did this particularly also because
of the hearing aid, because in this matter 'Yith a
hearing aid to improve this man's hearing he still
8
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will only hear 75% with a hearing aid in the
right ear.
Another factor was that Mr. Carling does not
demonstrate in speech any particular loss for pronouncing consonants. Between one and two thousand cycles per second he has a. hearing loss which
is sufficient to have caused him - would it have
been a congenital loss, and ha.d occurred since he
wa.s a. youth, or since he was born - to have affected his speech. That he- would not pronounce
his consonants clearly, especially with a discrimination loss, as he exhibited in this test. I therefore felt it was important to determine whether
this could have been a pre-existing condition, at
least as this particular loss, or whether something
that possibly could have happened more recently.
People who have lost their speech recently will
not exhibit a speech defect. Those who have had
it for a number of years, or during their life, with
this amount of loss will exhibit a definite speech
defect when they speak. So that 'vas the reason
for requesting discrimination.

Q . Dr. Gray, when you are referring to this
matter of discrimination- for just the purpose of
further explication - they have a speech reception threshold, and then they refer here by spondees; is that the correct pronunciation?

A. Yes.
Q. Would you tell us what that refers to?

A. Well, we test people by spondees, 'v hich
are multiple syllable words, where it's two or three
syllables is different between a word such as
"the," or the word "itself," which are one srllable. A spondee consists of two or more syllables,
such as ''hardware,'' ''hotdog,'' ''staircase.''
This will allow the patient to better identify the
9
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word when he hears it. Running speech will mix
spondees and single syllable words, and the
threshold that these people hear will vary usually
between a spondee, which they can pick up generally the more readily than they can running
speech frequently because of the single words
that they will find in their speech.
Q. And this was-

A. He did better on spondees than he did
running speech.
Q. And this is identified in the report by 1Ir.
Fingerle?

A. Yes.
Q. As shown on these?

A. Yes.
Q. According to the first and second line under
the moneral ( ?) ?

A. The second section of the report, which is
testing of speech.
Q. Well, now, based upon your O\Vll examination, and the report of !fr. Fingerle, do you haYe
a considered medical opinion as to \Yhether the
los& of hearing - based upon your report, and
the statements of 1Ir. Carling- \Yere congenital-?

A. I definitely rule out a congenital loss in this
man.
Q. And based upon your reports, or the report
of Mr. Fingerle and the examination of ~Ir. Carling, what would be your considered medical opinion as to the cause of the impairment of the hearing in Mr. Carling's case?

A. His particular hearing test \Yhich \Ye received, of course - as many of you are a.\vare _

10
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\Yould be a hearing loss which could be found in
various types of eases. Whether it would be from
an acoustic. trauma, as we usually refer to this
particular injury, or whether it was a possibility
of a chronic. progressive hearing loss, referred to
frequently as presbycusis, was premature in this
particular gentleman, due to his age. Ho\vever,
from the report that he gave me his hearing had
been good, and that working around the noise that
he had had this sudden loss.
Now I of course questioned him, and he stated
that he had a prolonged history of exposure to
loud noises. Now when we think of acoustic
trauma, of course- espeeially in occupations such
as canning, or foundries, or boilermakers - you
generally can think in terms of a more prolonged
exposure. Although the literature of course confirms that people can on one sudden exposure much less than even a blast sound, but one sudden
exposure to soundo, with the proper predisposing
causes 'Yhich cannot be predetermined - v.rill actually suffer an injury from acoustic trauma.
It was my first and initial thought that possibly
with his many years of being in this type of work,
or this type of work where he was suffered, that
possibly this was a long exposure and a long time
of acoustic trauma which brought this on. But I
questioned him carefully, and of course his \Yife,
who maintained that this was an abrupt loss, and
that he of course maintained that thiH time he had
a sudden ringing in his ears, whieh would go along
with this injury to the cochlear, \\~hich is the nPr\·e
ending.
Under those circumstanceH, and with the report of Mr. Fingerle, I would be obliged to state
that he did suffer acoustic trauma on this pa rticular instance. I of course am not aware of any

11
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audiograms previous to this time. The total
amount of loss. Whether it was from zero or normal hearing down to where he is at the present
time, or whether he possibly had some hearing loss
before. I am not aware· of these. I cannot make
an accurate statement as to the total amount of
hearing loss that he suffered on this one particular instance. But his history and my findings led
me to diagnose the case as injury to acoustic
trauma.
Q. And this was traceable to the incident reported by Mr. Carling to you of using this gun~
A. 1\{r. Carling, yes. His history I accepted.
Q. All right. Now you spoke about predetermining the disposal of a person on the matter of
acoustic trauma. Would you briefly explain that
further1 What you meant by that statement?

A. Yes. Of course acoustic trauma first became common in the literature maybe a decade
ago, as people were beginning to be exposed to
loud industrial noises. Much of the :first work was
done in animal experimentation, and of course
some human subjects, in which there was frequently a characteristic loss of hearing at around
4,000 cycles per second. l\{uch more "Tork has
been done, especially in the field of high industrial
noise. Not such as jets, in 'vhich you might find
a particular frequency, but industrial noises such
as boilerma.king, and I'm not fully a"~ are of this
particular man's environment where he suffered
this, but the spectra of sound covers the entire
auditory spectrum. And they find that in these
particular people the hearing loss is not characteristic in one particular cycle, but we usuallv
go through the broad range of hearing.
·
'Vork has been done in giving people \Yhat they
call auditory loading, and taking employees ,vh~

12
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are being employed by a company and actually
testing their hearing with various auditory loading. By this I mean doing an audiogram, subjecting them to loud noises and then retesting
them, to see if there actually has been damage,
whether permanent or temporary, and see if they
might pick out various employees that would be
subject to acoustic trauma. Literature indicates
that there has been no good way of selecting employees who might be subject or might have a predisposing type of ear to acoustic trauma. That a
hundred employees, you just have to take your
chances on employing them, or else protecting
them with protective devices when they are exposed to industrial noise.
So in th.is particular case Mr. Carling, for example, possibly the only predisposing cause had
an employer taken this man and found that he
had already a predisposing nerve loss of significance, then they would not be able to detect whether he might be more subject to hearing· loss from
loud noises than another patient. All they could
do is say that it would be risky business to employ
him, because if he did suffer acoustic trauma., in
him, it would be of more serious nature than somebody who had normal hearing and who might well
tolerate a certain amount of industrial noise, even
if he did suffer small acoustic trauma.
Q. So this would mean that the decibels of auy
particular sound, the resulting action upon a person's nerves and hearing it would vary as to thP
individual; is that right~

A. That's true. Of course you take the average, and you know that certain lPvPls, 'vhieh i~
generally considered to be around somewhere
about a hundred decibels on up, which will in general be the type of noise which will injure thP

13
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normal human ear. Now both as to the level of
noise, there is variance between patients. Some
patients will react to much less noise than other
patients. In other words that they can be exposed to a lesser sound than this, and still have
acoustic trauma. Likewise, the length of exposure
varies from patient to patient. Some patients
may work in a factory for 30 years and suffer almost no acoustic trauma. More than you might
find in the average population. There will be
other patients, of course, or employees, who on one
brief exposure will actually suffer acoustic
trauma.
Q. Does the abruptness of a hearing change

indicate one condition as opposed to

another~

A. I don't understand the question.
Q. Of a hearing loss~ I mean an abruptness of
a hearing loss, or a marked change in the person's ability to hear every-day speech~ For instance if a person has a certain ability to hear
everyday speech, under everyday conditions, and
then is subject to some acoustic trauma, and then
there is an abrupt change in his ability to I "'\Yould
say converse in everyday speech under everyday
conditions~

A. You're speaking of speech no"T -?
Q. Well,-

A. Well, they're different. N O"'\Y let me just
go through this. Work has been experimentallv
on human subjects, in "'\Yhich they have taken no 1:_
mal subjects and who are being employed in a factory, in exposure to loud sounds. They ,viii then
retest them at the end of the day, for ex~mple, and
find evidence of temporary, or in some cases- but
more rarely - permanent damage. UsuallY it'~
a. temporary thing, and these patients actuall;r

14
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have a much lower score than they did. Not much,
hut I mean one which is statistically significant.
A lower score on their hearing test than they had
in the morning preceding their work. This, of
course, over an eight-hour period - or even less
time, whatever it might be - is one which is usually a temporary loss.
As far as speech, a person who does suffer for
example a sudden nerve loss, if a person has a
disease which might eradicate his hearing totally
in a period of almost a few seconds, these patients
will suffer no severe difference in their speech.
There is none detectible, except after a few years.
Gradually they begin to lose some of their pronunciation, but from one day to_ another you would
not be able to tell from a person's speech, except
that he is more likely to speak louder. \Vhen he
comes in to not hearing his own voice, he will generally speak much louder.
Q. Well, I'm referring to-when I was saying
ability to converse in everyday speech-I'm saying his ability to hear the other person, and therefore to respond and to communicate.

A. Oh, yes. Of course if he had a severe acoustic trauma, there would be an obvious change in his
response to people.
Q. Well, what I was referring to, if therf' 'vas
an abrupt change in this ability for just everyday
communication, traceable to one incident, does this
have significance? Or am I -

A. Why don't you say the queRtion ovpr
again 1
Q. Well, if I can put it in a clear way- just
being a layman in these matters - but if there is
a significant and abrupt change in n person's n bility to communicate-
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MR. BROWN: I would object to that question. I
think it assumes things not in evidence. I ha:e
heard no evidence that there has been a change In
his ability to hear normal conversation.
MR. YEATES: All right. I'm just referring to
any individual. I'm not referring this question to
Mr. Carling.
MR. BRowN : If you can put this as hypothetical
question.
1\IR. YEATES: All right.
THE REFEREE: Surely.
MR. YEATES: Q. Dr. Gray, if an individual has
the ability of everyday communication, under everyday circumstances, and then is subjected to a
loud noise, and immediately following that noise
there is a abrupt change and impairment in his
ability for everyday communication, would this
have significance~ In determining the type of injury or impairment, rather than a change that had
been non-progressive?
A. Yes.

Q. And 'vhat significance "\vould you place upon
this~

A. If a. person \\7 ere to come to me, and state
that yesterday he felt fine, that he awoke this
morning, or during this day his hearing ''Tas
much worse, of course this 'vould rule out certain
causes of hearing loss, or congenital loss, or progressive hearing loss, or hereditary hearing loss.
Such things as conductive loss. As otosclerosis.
It would definitely limit it to some of the verv
common, or '"'hatever cause might lead to suddei1
hearing loss. Such as an obstruction of the auditory artery, "\vhich "rould have a sudden hearinoloss. A virol disease, in 'vhirh the labyrinth ''""a~
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affected, and they would have a sudden loss. An
injury, acoustic trauma., and more commonly such
as a blast, in which a. person had been exposed to a
sudden blast, which is a common cause of sudden
and total hearing loss, or at least marked hearing
loss. So that the abrupt change in one's hearing
would certainly seem to limit it to a. certain group
of causes for hea-ring loss, rather than the whole
spectrum of causes.
Q. Dr. Gray, did you- on your examination
-test for all these various things you referred to
with l\Ir. Carling~

A. Well, there is little way of testing actually
the man's history. I related to his history, and I
have gone through his first testimony that he
stated that his particular hearing loss was sudden. We questioned him of course about his family, for the possibility of hereditary nerve loss,
which was not elicited in my conversation with
him. We of course ruled out the possibility of a
conductive hearing loss, which is of a different
type and which would definitely rule out an acoustic trauma. From the history we could rule out a
congenital, and by his speech of course, a congenital type of hearing loss. And I asked him had he
suffered any sudden dizzy spells, or had he ever
noticed any nausea or vomiting associated "~ith
dizziness, which would tend to rule out a la hyrinthitis, such a virol disease.
Q. Did he reply in the negative or affirmative 1

A. Well, he of course implied that he had not
suffered from these causes, nor was there any history that would suggest these other diseases. Of
course obstruction of an auditory artery usually
leads to abrupt and total hearing loss. Not al\\,.ays,
but frequently more than he has, and it generally
is more limited to one ear rather than both. Sueh
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as this man had. So - in ans"\ver to your question
- part of it is through history of course, and then
there is some testing, or :findings on physical examination, that would rule out these other causes
for hearing loss.'' (R. 18 through 29)
The physical circumstances, nature of the injury and
the conduct of petitioner forceably add credence and reliability to his uncontested testimony. This case is not
one wherein the uncontroverted testimony of the claimant was not subject to contradiction had the testimony in
fact been unreliable. Unlike the circumstances existing in
Smith v. Industrial Comrnission of Utah, 140 P. 2d 314,
petitioner's own testimony amply affords respondent
employer an opportunity to refute it through testimony of
other witnesses and by employer's own records. The
reason respondent employer did not attempt to do so is
obvious and demonstrates the reliability of such evidence.
In the Smith case the Utah Supreme Court stated:
''The commission apparently concluded that
plaintiff's testimony 'Yas inconsistent with other
conceded facts in the case .sand on that ground denied his application. This appears from the following excerpt from the decision :
'Applicant's recital of an accident is denied,
but there is no evidence in the record to the contrary. However, there are some Yery significant
facts which we cannot overlook. Applicant continued on the job and made no report to his employer until after he 'Yent to Ft. Douglas for a
physical examination on June 5 or 6, 1!1-!~. .A.J
that time he 'Yas adYised by an armY phYsician
that he had a hernia. On June 7, 19±~, i1e "~as
examined by Dr. Silas S. Smith "~ho confirmed the
report of the arn1y physician. Later on June ~3,
1942, applicant 'vent ~o the hospital for surgical
treatment. He 'vas discharged from the hospital
on J nne 27, 1942, and 'Ycnt to "~ork on ..._c\_ugnst 7,
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1942, for another employer, having left the defendant Continental Building Company employ on
May 9, 1942.... '
''The weakness of plaintiff's case is that there
is no evidence other than his own testimony that
he had any accident, or the details or effects thereof, and he is an interested witness. By the nature of the accident it is impossible to contradict
his testimony. Such a situation presents an opportunity for imposition.''
In that case the Supreme Court concluded:
'' ... In view of the fact that applicant 'vas the
only \Yitness to testify to the accident, to the resulting sensations, and to his reasons for not reporting it to his employer, and the further fact
that these facts were by their very nature exclusively within his own knowledge and therefore
could not be controverted by other testimony, the
commission could reasonably refuse to believe his
testimony, which they apparently did.''
See also Ka1;a.Zinakis v. Industrial Commission, 246
Pac. 698, 703.
In the instant case, the facts and circumstances demonstrating that petitioner suffered an accidental injury
on the date in question as testified to by petitioner \vere
not exclusively within his O\Vll knowledge. That petitioner has, in fact, had a loss of hearing was stipulated to
at the hearing (R. 71). Had petitioner's hearillg impairment prior to August 31, 1960, been that 'vhich was
established by the evidence, such condition would have
been readily discernible to his employer's supervisors
and to those who worked with him. The fact that no sueh
testimony was offered in this regard is significant.
When the accidental hearing impairment occurred, petitioner immediately reported it to his employer's fore-

19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

man. Thereafter petitioner reported to the dispensary
because of his loss of hearing. Had such testimony been
lacking in credibility and truthfulness, the employer had
ample means of so demonstrating. That employer did not
elect to do makes it arbitrary and unreasonable for respondent Commission to disregard such testimony or to
contend that there is not competent evidence in the record
to support the proposition that petitioner's hearing impairment derived from the use of the air gun on .L\_ugust 31, 1960. See Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines, Inc., v.
Welling, 339 P. 2d 1011.
Such testimony as supported by Dr. Gray, the other
evidence and the particular facts and circumstances and
by employer's failure or election not to contest it makes
the testimony of petitioner of such persuasive force that
the respondent Commission could not reasonabl~T find it
\vas not true.
As observed by this Court in Jones '· California
Packing Corp., 244 P. 2d 640:
''If the commission could go so far as to refuse
to believe such evidence in the absence of anything
of substance to refute it, then it certainly ''ould
possess arbitary powers with no restrictive reYiew
left aYailable to the litigant. .. ~"
See also Nicholson Y. Industrial Connn iss-ion of Utah
(1964) 389 P. 2d 730 \Yherein it was held that in passing
upon the propriety of a commission a:w·ard den~ing \Yorkmen's compensation benefits to an employee the revie"~
ing court has a dut~~ of examining the record to see
whether the commission arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence in favor of unsubstantial contradictorY
evidence.
·
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POINT II.
THAT THE RESPONDENT C01IJ\IISSION
CANNOT PROPERLY CONTEND THAT
THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT CO~IPETENT
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT
THE PETITIONER'S CLAI~i THAT HIS
HEARING IMP AIRJ\IIENT STE~IS FRO:l\1 THE
USE OF THE AIR GUN ON AUGUST 31, 1960,
IN VIEW OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION'S ACTION IN PREVENTING OR DISSUADING PETITIONER FROM INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON SUCH
QUESTION.
In addition to the petitioner's testimony and the
testimony of Dr. Gray petitioner 'Yas prepared to supply
additional details in regards to his hearing impairment
and to trace it to the use of the air gun on August 31,
1960, and to fully corroborate it by independent ''"'itnesses
whom were available at the hearing. The Referee for
respondent Commission stated for the record, however,
that such additional testimony was unnecessary (R. 71
and 72). By this action respondent Commission r lear ly
prevented, or at the very least, dissuaded petitioner from
presenting such supportive testimony (R. 71, 72).
Under these circumstances and in this posture, it is
improper for the respondent Commission to now base
its finding and order on a lack of competent evidence to
support such incident as the cause of petitioner's hearing
loss. Any such lack of evidence, if we assume, arguendo,
it does exist, resulted solely from the position taken hy
the Referee for respondent Commission at the hearing
and not from the lack of, unavailability of, or failure of
petitioner to be prepared 'vith such PvidenrP.
In Cooper v. Industrial Commission of l Tfah (1963)
387 P. 2d 689, the Utah Supreme Court held that it is an
elemental principle of justice that a party seeking adjudication of his rights should not be neither prcvP11ted nor
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dissuaded from presenting any evidence he desires \vhich
is competent and material to the issues. See also H arlafJ~
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 391 P. 2d 838.
POINT III.
'THAT PETITIONER'S HEARING DISABILITY IS COMPENSABLE TYPE OF ACCIDEXTAL INJURY PURSUANT TO TITLE 35,
CHAPTER 1 OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, AS A1\1:ENDED.
Petitioner contends that the record establishes that
petitioner suffered an accidental injury on August 31,
1960, resulting in a permanent partial disability to his
hearing. It is conceded that petitioner did suffer loss of
hearing (R. 71) and petitioner believes that the conclusion is inescapable that this hearing loss \Yas occasioned
by an acoustic trauma resulting from the use of the air
gun on August 31, 1960 (R. 22 through 31 and R. 68) and
for the respondent Commission to rule otherwise is
arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious.
Prior to the hearing the only dispute bet"~een the
respondent Commission and the petitioner \Yas the extent of petitioner's hearing impairment. ..At no time had
the fact that petitioner had suffered an accidental injury
while in the course of employment \Yith employer been
raised. This is consistent "'"ith the apparent position
taken by the Referee for the Commission at the time of
the hearing (R. 71, 72). Yet the Commission bY its order
now bases its denial of compensation on the ·conclusion
that petitioner's hearing loss ,,,.as not the result of an
accidental injury but '"'as, in fact, caused by an industrial disease.
The only competent medical testimony presented at
the hearing \vas that of Dr. Gray, called by the petitioner.
and that of Dr. Larson, 'vho is employed by emplover at
its medieal dispensary. Petitioner contends it is l;nreasonable for the Commission to attempt to justify its
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conclusion on the report of the medical panel or the reports of other doctors which did not testify at the hearing. See Ha.ckford v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
358 P. 2d 899; Holla;nd v. In.dustria.l Commission. of Utah,
297 P. 2d 230.
Respondent Commission in supporting its order that
petitioner did not suffer an accidental acoustical trauma
purports to rely upon the testimony of Dr. Dean Gray
and in its order states :
"Dr. Dean W. Gray stated Page 29, Trs. that,
'of course, obstruction of an auditory artery usually leads to abrupt and total hearing loss. Not always but frequently more than he has, and it generally is limited to one ear rather than both. Such
as this man's had.' ''
An examination of Dr. Gray's testimony demonstrates, ho\vever, that the cited quotation is lifted out of
context, is contra to his stated conclusions and is not;in
fact, even correctly interpreted by the respondent Commission (R. 29, 22, 23, 49 and 50). Dr. Gray clearly
concluded in his testimony that from his O\vn examination
and from the studies of l\Ir. Fingerle (Exhibit No. 7)
that petitioner's loss of hearing resulted from an acoustic
trauma occasioned by the use of the air gun on August
31, 1960 (R. 22, 23, 49 and 50).
Dr. Larson, who is not an ear specialist, and \Yho is
employed by employer, does not attempt to controvert
the conclusion reached by Dr. Gray in hiR testimony (R.
59, 63, 64, 68 and 69).
Significantly, none of the doctors employed by employer who actually examined petitioner at the time he
reported to the dispensary were called as \ritncsses h~r
respondent employer. Under these circumstanel)H petitioner contends that all of the competent and material
evidence which respondent Commission relies upon doeR
not support its conclusion and order. Such evidence, including the exhibits, at most establishes the posHibility
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that petitioner had a pre-existing condition or a pro pensity for acoustical trauma and that such condition o_r
propensity was acted upon and aggravated by the acoust~
cal trauma resulting from the use of the air gun by petitioner. There is, in fact, no competent evidence to esta blish a long exposure to loud noises, nor is petitioner's testimony that he had never before used an air gun for the
purpose of tamping sand into metal pipes refuted (R. 98) .
. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed
the proposition that the Workmen's Compensation Act
should be liberally construed in favor of coverage of an
employee. Askren v. Industrial Commission of Utah
(1964), 391 P. 2d 302; Spencer v. Industrial Commission
of Utah, 290 P. 2d 692; Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Company, 386 P. 2d 616, Jones v. California Packing Corp.,
244· P. 2d 640, and by courts of other jurisdictions, Crest
Building Corpora.tion v. Lowe, 388 P. 2d 512 (Okla.):
Adams v. Reid Roller Bit Co1npany, 335 P. 2d 1080
(Okla.); Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 203 P. 2d 171
(Kansas); American. Indemnity Company v. State Con1pensation Insurance Fund, 116 P. 2d 919 (Colo.).
In reference to the interpretation of the word '' accident" as used in Section 35-1-45, the Utah Supreme Court
made the follo,ving observation:
"This very problem \vas discussed and legislatures were advised that if the result reached in
Fenton v. Thornley, supra, "~as intended . the use
of the term ''injury by accident,'' since its meaning had been construed to mean only an unexpected result, \Yas desirable. Thereafter . "Tith full
access to that decision and article our legislature
enacted our Workmen's Compensation La\Y and
adopted the term 'injury by accident.' It is the
familiar doctrine of statutory construction that
\vhere a legislature adopts a statute \Yhich has
already ?een construed, it usually adopts the
construction placed thereon. Fuller-To ponce
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Truck Co. v. Public Service Commission, 99 Utah
28, 96 P. 2d 722. The conclusion is unavoidable
that in so doing the legislature intended to adopt
the construction given to those words by Fenton v.
Thornley, supra.
''This court has accordingly held over and
over again that such was the meaning of that
term . . . that the unexpected injury was all tha.t
wa.s necessary.'' (emphasis added)
See Purity Bisc~tit Company v. Industrial Commi-ssion, 201 P. 2d 961.
In Jones v. California Packing Corp., 244 P. 2d 640,
6-42, the Utah Supreme Court stated in reference to aggravation of an existing condition as follows:
"It is settled beyond question that a pre-existing disease or other disturbed condition or defect
of the body, when aggravated or lighted up by an
industrial accident, is compensable under the Act,
Graybar Elec-tric Co., Inc., v. Industrial Comm.,
73 Utah 568, 276 P. 161; Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass 'n v. Industrial Comm.,
104 Utah 61, 138 P. 2d 233. And also that an internal failure brought about by exertion in the
course of employment may be an accident 'vithin
the meaning of Sec. 42-1-43, U. C. A. 1943, (Sec.
35-1-45, U. C. A. 1953) without the requirement
that the injury results from some incident which
happened suddenly and is identifiable at a definite
time and place. ''
See also Makoff Company v. Industrial Comtnission of
U ta.h, 368 P. 2d 70.
Thus, this Court is committed to the proposition that
the Workmen's Compensation Act prescribes no standard
of health necessary to bring an employee under the law
and accidental injuries are compensable thereunder where
the accident only serves to aggravate a pre-existing con-
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dition. Thus, petitioner contends that by all the sta~d
ards of this Court a.pplica ble to the circumstances 1nvolved herein and from the evidence adduced at the
hearing, that petitioner suffered a compensable accid~nt,
that being an unexpected and unforeseen loss of hearing
as the result of using an air gun while employed by employer on August 31, 1960. This is not affected by the
fact that such air gun procedures would not have produced this result upon another individual.
Although there does not appear to be any specific
rulings by the utah Supreme Court in reference to a
trauma tic loss of hearing as a compensable accident,
petitioner submits that the loss of hearing as the result
of acoustic trauma is as much of an accident as a hernia
resulting from muscular strain or nerve injury from
poisonous gas. (In,jury and Dea.th Under TVor1nnen.'s
Compen.sa.tion. Laws,. Samuel B. Horovitz, p. 76.) In
Win.kelmwn v. Boeing Airplane Compa;ny, 203 P. 2d 171
(I(ansas), the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "There
an employee served as assistant instructor of guards at
employer's indoor pistol range and employee lost his
hearing because of volume, intensity and high pitch of
gunfire explosions at rifle range, the employee sustained
an ''injury'' by ''accident'' \vhich arose out of and in
course of employment and his exclusiYe remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and further held
as f ollo,vs :
'' . . . Assuming traumatic deafness may in
some sense properly be denominated an industrial
disease, as it appears to be by some ""'Titers, the
fact remains that here a portion of this man's
physical structure \Yas definitelY broken do\Y11 bY
accidental injury. For that inj~rY recoYery could
have been had under our act. "\\T e think. under
such circumstances 've "\Yould not be justified in
denominating the injury solely and purelv an industrial disease and thereby deny a \York~an recovery under our act. To deny recoYery in this
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situation would not, in our opinion, constitute liberal, but strict and technical, interpretation of our
act against a workman. Under our repeated decisions \Ye are not permitted to give it such interpretation.''
See also Great America.n Indemnity Co. v. State
Compensation Insurance Fund (Colo.) 116 P. 2d 919 and
Adams v. Reid Roller Bit Company (Okla.) 335 P. 2d.
1080, 1084.
CONCLUSION
That the Commission has erred in denying the petitioner an award for compensation and in its order which
is contrary to the evidence and to the concepts laid down
by this Court concerning the application of the Utah
Workmen's Compensation Act.
Respectfully submitted,
MULLINER, PRINCE & ~fANGU~I
ROBERT l\I. YEATES
206 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Petitioner
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